Inter-organisational knowledge transfer strategies by Chen, Shizhong et al.
Inter-organisational Knowledge Transfer Strategies For 
SMEs 
 
Shizhong Chen1, Yanqing Duan1, John S. Edwards2, Russell Kinman1 
1Luton Business School, University of Luton, Luton, UK 
2Aston Business School, Aston University, Birmingham, UK 
 
Inter-organisational knowledge transfer is very important for SMEs. However, compared to 
knowledge transfer within an organisation, its ‘boundary paradox’ makes its process more complicated 
and difficult to understand. In order to solve the ‘paradox’, inter-organisational knowledge transfer 
strategies need to be developed for SMEs. Through a review of the literature on knowledge transfer, 
this paper proposes an inter-organisational knowledge transfer process model that contains four stages 
(initiation, selection, interaction and conversion). It classifies three situations in which an SME 
exchanges knowledge with a customer (whether a larger company or an SME). It then applies a co-
ordinating mechanism to analyse knowledge transfer strategies for the SME when it is a knowledge-
giving firm and knowledge-receiving firm respectively, in the different stages of each situation. 
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Introduction 
 
The importance of inter-organisational knowledge transfer for SMEs is demonstrated by 
several studies (Sparrow, 2000; Duan et al., 2001). However, inter-organisational knowledge 
transfer also poses a ‘boundary paradox’ to the SME. That is, its borders must be open to 
flows of information and knowledge from the networks and markets in which it operates, but, 
at the same time, the SME must protect and nurture its own knowledge base and intellectual 
capital (Quintas et al., 1997; Beeby and Booth, 2000; Chen et al., 2002; Mohr and Sengupta, 
2002). In other words, there is a ‘knowledge-sharing’ versus ‘knowledge-security’ trade-off 
that has to be resolved by appropriate strategies. 
 
Increasing attention (Von Hippel, 1987; Carter, 1989; Albino et al., 1999; Dyer and Nobeoka, 
2000; Parker and Vaidya, 2001; Grundmann, 2001; Chen et al., 2002) has been paid to this 
strategic issue. However, only a few studies (Schrader, 1991; McEvily et al., 2000; Mohr and 
Sengupta, 2002) explicitly discuss strategies. McEvily et al. (2000) propose knowledge 
transfer strategies that suggest firms use their marketing powers or superior business 
performance to prevent their competitive advantage from being substituted by other firms. 
Assuming that employees trade information (or know-how) in accordance with the economic 
interests of their firms, Schrader (1991) analyses strategies for the employees on their 
decision whether to transfer information (or know-how) to counterparts from other firms. 
Mohr and Sengupta (2002) argue that “Prior research has not explicitly addressed the paradox 
inherent in inter-firm learning”, thus highlighting the role of firms’ governance mechanisms 
in dealing with the ‘paradox’ of inter-firm learning, and further propose some governance 
strategies for different situations. Obviously, McEvily et al.’s (2000) strategies may not be 
suitable for SMEs because of their limited market power and expertise. The strategies 
proposed by Mohr and Sengupta (2002) are not exclusively developed for SMEs either. The 
literature on informal knowledge trading (Schrader, 1991; Von Hippel, 1987; Carter, 1989) 
focuses on studying knowledge transfer through employees’ private relationship networks, 
without company management’s involvement, and “the authors tend to assume that only 
direct solutions to specific problems are sought through these channels” (McEvily et al., 
2000). So, inter-organisational knowledge transfer strategies for SMEs largely have been 
neglected. Furthermore, inter-firm knowledge transfer strategies are “more complex than 
those envisioned in a simple, two-party Prisoner’s Dilemma,” and have “multiple layers of 
trading incentives and strategies active in a single trading entity as well” (Von Hippel, 1987). 
Mohr and Sengupta (2002) also argue that: “There may be subtle but important differences in 
learning from a partner compared to teaching a partner. Similarly, there may be value in 
exploring issues – about how to learn from a partner as well as teaching a partner how to 
learn.” Accordingly, this paper will try to address possible strategies for SMEs at two levels 
(i.e., inter-organisational layer and inter-employee layer) and from two perspectives (i.e., how 
to learn from a partner, and teaching a partner how to learn). 
 
Overview of Knowledge Transfer 
 
Knowledge transfer implies that, knowledge is transferred from the sender(s) (person, or 
group, or team, or organisation) to the recipient(s) (person, or group, or team, or organisation) 
(Chen et al., 2002; Lind and Seigerroth, 2000; Lind and Persborn, 2000; Bender and Fish, 
2000; Albino et al., 1999).  
 
Knowledge transfer is often found to be laborious, time consuming and difficult, however, the 
difficulty experienced in the process of knowledge transfer has received little systematic 
attention (Szulanski, 2000; Huber, 2001). Szulanski (2000) argues that knowledge transfer is 
a process in which ‘difficulty’ should be seen as its characteristic feature; this process view 
may help organisations incorporate difficulty in the analysis of knowledge transfer. He further 
proposes a process model for intra-organisational knowledge transfer which contains four 
stages – initiation, implementation, ramp-up and integration (see Figure 1). 
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Figure 1  The process for knowledge transfer within an organisation (Szulanski, 2000) 
 
In the initiation stage, the effort aims to find an opportunity to transfer and to decide whether 
to pursue it. An opportunity to transfer exists as soon as the seed for that transfer is formed, 
i.e., as soon as a gap is found within the organisation and the knowledge to address the gap is 
thought to be available. In the implementation stage, following the decision to transfer 
knowledge, attention shifts to the exchange of information and resources between the source 
and the recipient, i.e., “learning before doing” for the recipient. In the ramp-up stage, the 
recipient begins using acquired knowledge, and tries to ‘ramp-up’ to satisfactory 
performance, i.e., “learning by doing” for the recipient. In the integration stage, the recipient 
takes subsequent follow-through and evaluation efforts to integrate the practice with other 
practices. Szulanski analyses the transfer difficulties in each stage of this process. 
 
Although the process model outlined above describes the knowledge transfer process within 
an organisation, not the inter-organisational knowledge transfer process, it demonstrates that 
the process view does help organisations gain a better understanding of the complexities and 
difficulties in knowledge transfer. So, this paper will use the same view to propose a process 
model for inter-organisational knowledge transfer because knowledge transfer between 
organisations is much more complicated than within an organisation (Chen et al., 2002). The 
specific difference is that, within an organisation, the organisation should try to expand the 
amount of shared knowledge among its employees to an appropriate level (or to the highest 
level possible), so as to develop (or preserve) its competitive advantage (Lind and Seigerroth, 
2000; Chen et al., 2002). However, between organisations, the organisations have to face ‘the 
boundary paradox’, more complicated factors will impinge on the transaction, more strict 
governance mechanisms are required to regulate the transfer content, and much higher loyalty 
requirements will be placed on relevant employees. 
 
Von Hippel (1987) classifies know-how trading into two routines: informal and formal, and 
provides a definition for the former but not the latter. Informal inter-organisational knowledge 
transfer has received somewhat more attention in the literature (Schrader, 1991; Carter, 1989). 
This paper will focus on formal inter-organisational knowledge transfer. Based on Von 
Hippel’s definition, formal inter-organisational knowledge transfer might be defined as: for 
their own organisational business, employees from different organisations exchange 
knowledge mainly through formal, organisational channels. Sometimes the formal way may 
be converted into or embrace informal transfer. For instance, if employee A acquires some 
knowledge from employee B in another firm through formal connections, their subsequent 
friendship might encourage subsequent informal exchange. It may therefore be difficult to 
make a clear-cut distinction between the two transfer forms.  
 
Chen et al. (2002) suggest that the formal inter-organisational knowledge transfer process can 
be divided into two sub-processes: 1) inter-employee learning between employees from 
different organisations; 2) once the receiving employee acquires the needed knowledge, the 
individual learning will be converted into organisational learning through organisational 
internal mechanisms. Drawing on Szulanski’s (2000) process model (Figure 1), a similar four-
stage model is offered (see Figure 2). The first sub-process is further divided into three stages: 
initiation, selection and interaction; the second sub-process is called conversion.  
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Figure 2   The process for formal inter-organisational knowledge transfer 
 
In the initiation stage, two organisations try to find an opportunity to transfer and to decide 
whether to pursue it through negotiation. In the selection stage, the receiving and giving 
organisations select an employee as a receiving and giving employee respectively (more than 
one employee may be involved, of course, in either organisation). In the interaction stage, the 
giving employee transfers his knowledge to the receiving employee. In the conversion stage, 
the receiving employee transfers his acquired knowledge to his employer – the receiving 
organisation. The conversion stage is only related to the receiving organisation and receiving 
employee. 
 
The relationship between the formal inter-organisational knowledge transfer process model 
and Szulanski’s (2000) process model may be seen as follows: 1) The initiation and 
interaction stages of the former are similar to the initiation and implementation stages of the 
latter. 2) In the conversion stage of the former, the receiving employee plays two roles: firstly, 
he is a recipient, will apply his acquired knowledge to his work, and have to experience the 
ramp-up and integration stages; secondly, he is also a source for his organisation – his 
colleagues may learn from him, completing the whole transfer process within an organisation. 
So, the conversion stage contains the ramp-up and integration stages, as well as the whole 
transfer process within an organisation. 
 
Through analysing the factors influencing formal inter-organisational knowledge transfer by 
means of social network theory, Chen et al (2002) suggest that there is a co-ordinating 
mechanism that exists in the transfer. They apply this mechanism to knowledge transfer 
between an SME and its customer (or supplier) (see Figure 3). The SME may be a receiving 
organisation or giving organisation. It is inevitable that a social actor who decides to trust 
another actor extrapolates on limited available information about the future behaviour of this 
actor, which has some risks (Bachmann, 1999). Power is the ability to influence people. It is 
the ability to get someone to do or not to do something, to persuade or dissuade (Zand, 1997). 
The relationship between trust and power is complex. On the one hand, they can be seen as 
alternative and compatible means – which do not exclude each other but occur in combination 
in many cases – to fulfil the same social function. On the other hand, power often appears as a 
precondition rather than an alternative to trust, and can foster the constitution of trust and 
minimise the risk of trust (Bachmann, 1999). Since trust and power both have drawbacks if 
used alone, a combination often seems to be the only way to ensure that the co-ordination of 
expectations and interactions is achieved satisfactorily. In fact most relationships are usually 
based on a mixture of both trust and power (Bachmann, 1999).  
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Figure 3   The co-ordinating mechanism for inter-organisational knowledge transfer 
 
The co-ordinating mechanism can be used to help an SME to develop its strategies for each 
stage of the formal process model. However, because the conversion stage is actually 
involved in knowledge transfer within an organisation – relatively the subject of considerable 
attention in the literature –  (e.g., Szulanski (2000), Goh (2002), Argyris and Schon (1996), 
Dodgson (1993) and Cohen et al. (1990)),  this paper  focuses on the first three stages, and 
uses the mechanism to analyse the strategies for an SME when it is a receiving firm or giving 
firm in the context of a supply chain. 
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Strategies for Inter-organisational Knowledge Transfer for SMEs 
 
Strategies When an SME is a Giving Firm 
 
If an SME holds some knowledge in the context of a supply chain, it may give the knowledge 
to its customers or suppliers. Using customers as the example, the SME may face the three 
situations shown in Table 1.  
 
Table 1.  The Situations and Corresponding Strategies When an SME Is a Giving Firm 
Situation No Situations Strategies 
 
1 
Both the SME and its customer want the 
knowledge transaction on the basis of 
reciprocation. 
Propositions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6a, 6b, 7a, 7b, 8a, 
8b. 
 
 
2 
The SME does not want to contribute the 
knowledge, but its customer may use 
power (e.g., market power) to force its 
contribution. 
Propositions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7a, 7b, 8a, 8b. 
Propositions 6a and 6b may not be suitable 
for this situation. 
 
3 
Both the SME and customer want the 
knowledge transaction, but customerC 
(i.e., another customer) uses power 
(especially market power) to threaten the 
SME. 
 
Propositions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6a, 6b, 7a, 7b, 8a, 
8b, 9a, 9b, 9c. 
 
 
Situation 1: Reciprocation (as Giver) 
In this situation, both the SME and its customer want the knowledge transaction on the basis 
of reciprocation. The strategies for the SME in each stage are analysed, by means of the co-
ordinating mechanism, as follows. 
 
In the initiation stage, the SME is identified by its customer as an external knowledge 
source. Both sides will negotiate to decide whether to pursue the knowledge transfer. The 
relevant actors are the SME and customer. So, the co-ordinating mechanism may be 
simplified as the following figure 4. 
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Figure 4 The relevant actors and their relationships in the initiation stage 
 
From Figure 4, it may be suggested that the SME and customer are connected through the 
extent of power (e.g., business dependence) and trust between them. The SME will analyse 
various factors that affect its costs and benefits according to their relationship. 
 
The costs may be influenced by the following factors: 
(1)  The importance of the knowledge for the SME 
Although the customer is not a competitor for the SME, and the transaction will not directly 
damage the SME’s competitive advantages, the SME may still face a risk that the customer 
may give the knowledge to other companies (especially the SME’s competitors). The SME 
will therefore refuse to give the knowledge to other companies no matter who they are if the 
knowledge is vital to its own business (Shrader, 1991).  
 
      SME 
  
Customer 
Proposition 1: the more important the knowledge is for the SME, the less likely it is that it 
will give the knowledge to its customer. 
 
(2)  Availability of alternative knowledge sources 
If the customer could acquire the knowledge from other external sources or develop the 
knowledge by itself without great effort and difficulty (Shrader, 1991), the SME, as a 
knowledge source, has not much advantage over other companies, may not treat the 
knowledge as important, and may feel that it does not lose much if the knowledge is 
transferred. Conversely, the relationship may be adversely influenced if the SME does not 
agree to the transaction.  
Proposition 2: the more likely it is that a customer can acquire the knowledge from other 
external sources or develop it by itself without great effort and difficulty, the more likely it 
is that the SME will give the knowledge to that customer. 
 
(3)  The SME’s business dependence on the customer 
If the SME’s business is highly dependent upon the customer, the former will attach much 
importance to meeting the latter’s requirements. Otherwise, its business will be heavily 
damaged. Therefore, when the customer requests the SME to offer some knowledge, a 
proposition may be described as follows: 
Proposition 3: the more the SME’s business depends on the customer, the more likely the 
SME will be to give the knowledge to the customer. 
 
The benefits may be influenced by the following factors: 
Schrader (1991) points out that: “transferring information is part of exchange relationships 
grounded in reciprocity. In exchange relationships, providing another party with a favour 
obliges that party to reciprocate in order to maintain the balance of benefits and contributions, 
even without an explicit agreement.” Based on this concept of reciprocity, the SME may 
expect some important benefits from the customer if it offers some important knowledge to it. 
In order to make sure the reciprocity occurs, the SME may consider the following risks: 
 
(4)  The ability of the customer to provide reciprocal benefit       
When a receiving firm acquires the needed knowledge from the giving firm, it may provide 
other knowledge or payment to compensate the giving firm at that time or in the future. 
However, if the receiving firm has no or limited ability to reciprocate, the latter may face 
some risk of losing the expected benefits (Schrader, 1991; Von Hippel, 1987). Thus, the SME 
may assess the customer’s ability to reciprocate before it agrees to the transaction; if the 
ability is poor, it may abandon the transaction. 
Proposition 4: the higher the ability of the customer to reciprocate, the more likely the SME 
is to provide the knowledge.  
 
(5)  The trust between the SME and customer 
The SME may face the risks of losing some benefits because some of the expected benefits of 
the knowledge transfer have to be received in the future (Schrader, 1991). In order to 
minimise these risks, the SME will prefer to deal only with a trustworthy customer. This 
judgement may be based on previous co-operation and the customer’s previous behaviour. If 
they trust each other, the SME may feel confident in receiving the expected benefits from the 
customer, otherwise, the SME may prefer to avoid the transaction. 
Proposition 5: the higher the trust between the SME and a customer, the more likely the 
SME is to agree to the knowledge transaction. 
 
The SME will negotiate with the customer, then consider the latter’s responses and select one 
of the possible solutions to acquire maximum anticipated benefits or minimum anticipated 
costs. Appleyard (1996) argues that knowledge transfer is undertaken by firms which process 
knowledge on the basis of anticipated costs and benefits, so that even rivals would share their 
knowledge if the benefits are larger than the costs. If the argument is extended to a third party, 
the following formula is suggested:  
 
Anticipated benefits – anticipated costs + anticipated benefits from a third party – 
anticipated costs from the third party >= minimum benefits that the firm feels to be 
acceptable.     (for the transfer to go ahead) 
 
The SME will use the formula to check if the knowledge transaction is acceptable. However, 
the formula is only a necessary condition for it to reach the deal. There are two kinds of 
uncertainties: 1) the values of the anticipated costs and benefits are estimated, so it is 
unknown to what extent the estimated values are close to their true values; 2) it is also 
unknown if the anticipated costs and benefits will actually appear at all. There are, therefore, 
risks. The SME must find good reasons to convince itself that the relevant partners will 
behave as it expects. In other words, it must trust the partners’ future behaviour. 
 
The receiving firm (i.e. the customer) will make a similar cost and benefit analysis. If either 
party of the two feels that the transaction is unacceptable, the transaction will fail. 
 
In the selection stage. Once the SME and customer reach a deal, the SME will use its power 
to select one (or more) employee (s) to do the specific work related to the transfer. From the 
SME’s perspective, the actors are the SME and its giving employee. The co-ordinating 
mechanism can be simplified as in Figure 5.  
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                 Figure 5   The SME (giving firm) and its giving employee in the selection stage  
 
The giving employee is a key person in the knowledge transfer between the SME and the 
customer. His or her prior experience in the area of the transferred knowledge and 
expressiveness will heavily influence the knowledge transfer effectiveness (Cohen et al, 1990; 
Chen et al, 2002). However, this does not mean that the SME should use the most skilled 
negotiator as a giving employee for every knowledge transaction with the customer no matter 
what the transferred knowledge is. Some knowledge is easily transferred, or not high in value 
to the customer, and the SME will not receive highly valuable reciprocation. But if the 
knowledge is difficult to transfer, or of high value for the customer, the SME may arrange a 
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well-qualified employee to transfer the knowledge to ensure successful transfer and 
appropriate reciprocity. Whomever is used, however, they must be able to follow instructions 
be reliable, and, above all, trustworthy. 
Proposition 6a: the more difficult the knowledge is to be transferred, the more likely the 
SME is to select a giving employee who is trustworthy, and has good prior experience and 
expressiveness. 
Proposition 6b: the higher the value of the transferred knowledge, the more likely the SME 
is to select a giving employee who is trustworthy, and has good prior experience and 
expressiveness. 
 
In the interaction stage, the giving employee will transfer the knowledge to the receiving 
employee from the customer, and mainly interact with his or her employer (i.e., the SME) and 
the receiving employee. The co-ordinating mechanism can be simplified as in figure 6. 
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Figure 6   The relevant actors and their interactions in the interaction stage 
 
Figure 6 shows that the giving employee’s behaviours are influenced by both power and trust 
from the SME and receiving employee. If the SME’s influence is weaker than the receiving 
employee, the giving employee may transfer knowledge as the receiving employee wants, not 
as the SME wants. In order to increase its influence on the giving employee, the SME may set 
up its strategies based on the following points: 
 
(1)  The duration of the transfer 
If the duration of the transfer is sufficiently long, the giving employee may build up a close 
inter-personal relationship with the receiving employee even if they did not know each other 
before (Mohr and Sengupta, 2002). Some important knowledge may be transferred through 
their personal relationship network. If the giving employee does not behave as the SME 
wishes, unrestrained knowledge transfer may happen, and the SME may face the risk of 
competitive backlash. So a strict governance mechanism (e.g., contract to limit the giving 
employee’s behaviour) should be imposed by the SME. 
 
However, as knowledge (especially tacit knowledge) is difficult to find and difficult to audit, 
the SME cannot readily monitor the giving employee’s behaviour. Secondly, it is difficult to 
precisely define or detail in contracts (or blueprints, patents and scientific text) the knowledge 
to be transferred. Property rights in knowledge are also narrowly defined (Parker and Vaidya, 
2001; Liebeskind, 1996). Thus the SME must use a reliable employee as the giving employee 
who can carry out the knowledge transfer tasks in accordance with the economic interests of 
the SME. Secondly, the SME should build up its own corporate culture to enhance 
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employees’ loyalty, and employ other motivation mechanisms to induce desirable knowledge 
transfer behaviour. 
Proposition 7a: in order to prevent the leakage of valuable knowledge, the longer the 
duration of the transfer, the stricter governance mechanism the SME should have. 
Proposition 7b: in order to prevent the leakage of valuable knowledge, the longer the 
duration of the transfer, the more reliable giving employee and more effective corporate 
culture based on trust are needed. 
 
(2) Difficulty of the transfer 
Tacit knowledge is less transparent than explicit knowledge, and also more difficult to 
transfer than the latter. Its transfer normally requires that the receiving employee interact 
intensively with the giving employee face-to-face. Both sides are therefore more likely to 
establish a close personal relationship (Mohr and Sengupta, 2002). Therefore, another 
proposition may be described as follows: 
Proposition 8a: in order to prevent the leakage of valuable knowledge, the more difficult 
the knowledge is to be transferred, the stricter governance mechanism the SME should 
have. 
Proposition 8b: in order to prevent the leakage of valuable knowledge, the more difficult 
the knowledge is to be transferred, the more reliable giving employee and more effective 
corporate culture based on trust are needed. 
 
Situation 2: the Reluctant Giver 
In situation 2, the SME does not want to contribute the knowledge, but its customer may use 
power (e.g. market power) to force its contribution. The difference between this and situation 
1 is that the SME is unwilling to transfer the knowledge. This may make the SME have 
different strategies in selecting a giving employee. If the knowledge is easily transferred, or 
not high of value, the SME may allow matter to proceed. But if the knowledge is difficult to 
transfer, or high of value, the selection of the giving employee for the SME will be influenced 
by its reluctance to part with the knowledge. It is open to doubt that the SME would like to 
select a well-qualified employee as a giving employee. So, propositions 6a and 6b may not 
apply in this situation. 
 
Other strategies for situation 2 are the same as those of situation 1 because the SME may 
experience similar problems in the two situations. 
 
Situation 3: Third Party Interference (with Giving) 
In situation 3, both the SME and customer want the knowledge transaction, but customerC 
(i.e., another customer) wants to use its relationship (i.e., power – especially market power – 
and the extent of the trust with the SME) with the SME to stop the knowledge transaction. 
The co-ordinating mechanism for the initiation stage can be simplified as in figure 7. 
 
Generally speaking, although customer and customerC are competitors, this does not mean 
that they will compete on every dimension of their business. If the transferred knowledge 
relates to a non-competitive dimension of their businesses, customerC may not threaten the 
knowledge transaction. Where the two customers compete, however, the SME will compare 
the influences from both customer and customerC, and make a choice between them. The 
propositions for the customer in situation 1 are still appropriate to the customer in situation 3. 
However, if the SME does as customerC wants, and gives up the knowledge transaction with 
the other customer, it may expect some benefits from customerC to compensate the losses 
caused by the abandonment of the transfer. In order to make sure the expected benefits 
materialise, it will assess customerC’s ability to reciprocate, its business dependence and the 
extent of trust. For instance, if customerC’s ability to reciprocate is very strong, it is more 
likely that the SME will receive the expected benefits from customerC, and so it will choose to 
stop the knowledge transaction. Similar analyses can be made for both business dependence 
and trust. 
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Figure 7   The relevant actors and their relationships in the initiation stage of the situation 3 
 
Proposition 9a: the higher the ability of customerC to reciprocate, the more likely the SME 
is to stop the transaction.  
Proposition 9b: the higher the trust between the SME and customerC, the more likely the 
SME is to stop the transaction. 
Proposition 9c: the more the SME’s business dependence on the customerC, the more likely 
the SME is to stop the transaction. 
 
Strategies When an SME is a Receiving Firm 
 
When an SME is in the position of the receiving firm, there are again three situations as 
shown in Table 2.  
 
Table 2.  The Situations and Corresponding Strategies When an SME Is an Receiving Firm 
Situation No Situations Strategies 
 
4 
Both the SME and its customer want the 
knowledge transaction on the basis of 
reciprocation. 
Propositions 10a, 10b, 11a, 11b.  
 
 
5 
The SME forces its customer to 
contribute some knowledge. 
Same as situation 4. However, the SME should 
properly mitigate the tense relationship with the 
customer, and pay attention to the latter’s covert 
behaviours against the transfer. 
 
 
6 
 
Both the SME and its customer want the 
knowledge transaction on the basis of 
reciprocation, but the SMEC (i.e., the 
SME’s competitor) uses power 
(especially market power) to threaten the 
giving firm (i.e., the customer). 
 
Same as situation 4. But the SME should wisely 
give up the transaction if the SMEC’s influence 
on the customer is much stronger than it, or it 
may secretly try to do the transaction with other 
external knowledge sources. 
 
 
Situation 4: Reciprocation (as Receiver) 
In situation 4, both the SME and its customer want the knowledge transaction on the basis of 
reciprocation.  
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Customer    
 
CustomerC 
 
In the initiation stage, assuming that a customer has a solution that the SME wants to have to 
deal with its internal problem, both sides will negotiate on the knowledge transaction. The 
customer, as a giving firm, may expect some benefits and costs based on the previous 
propositions for a knowledge-giving firm in the initiation stage. To have more chance to 
acquire the needed knowledge, the SME is suggested to do as follows: 
 Identify alternative knowledge sources as much as possible;  
 Avoid pursuing a knowledge transaction that costs much more than its ability to 
reciprocate;  
 Pay attention to its behaviour and co-operation with the customer; 
 Pursue the establishment of a trusting relationship with the customer; 
 Try to enhance its business connections with the customer. 
 
In the selection stage, the SME will select one employee (maybe several) as a receiving 
employee to acquire the needed knowledge from the giving firm (i.e., the customer). The 
difference between the selection of a receiving employee and a giving employee is that in this 
case absorptive ability is required (Cohen et al., 1990; Chen et al., 2002; Mohr and Sengupta, 
2002). Furthermore, the SME may positively try to acquire more knowledge than the 
customer wants to offer. However, the customer intuitively wants to protect its knowledge 
from diffusion, and only hopes to contribute what it wants to transfer. But the knowledge 
transfer task is eventually carried out by the giving employee. His personal objectives may 
not be in accordance with the economic interests of his employer. So, opportunities for the 
SME to acquire extra, high-value knowledge lie with the giving employee. Therefore the 
receiving employee is required to reliably do what the SME wants, and be skilled in social 
interaction with the giving employee.  
Proposition 10a: the more important the transferred knowledge is, the more likely the SME 
is to select a receiving employee who is trustworthy, good in both prior experience and 
absorptive ability, and skilled in social interaction. 
Proposition 10b: the more difficult the knowledge is to transfer , the more likely the SME is 
to select a receiving employee who is trustworthy, good in both prior experience and 
absorptive ability, and skilled in social interaction. 
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Figure 8   The Channels for the Receiving Employee to Influence the Giving Employee’s Behaviour 
 
In the interaction stage, the receiving employee will learn from the giving employee. The 
giving employee’s openness will directly influence the transfer effectiveness (Cohen et al., 
1990; Chen et al., 2002; Mohr and Sengupta, 2002). If the receiving employee wants to force 
the giving employee to raise his openness level, the receiving employee (see Figure 8) has to 
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      SME 
  
Customer  
go through the SME to ask the customer to exert powerful influence on the giving employee 
because the receiving employee has little personal power to influence the giving employee’s 
behaviour. The customer may positively respond to the appeal, but the giving employee still 
has many opportunities to make trouble for the giving employee if he is not replaced, because 
knowledge (especially tacit knowledge) transfer is difficult to audit. So, it is wise for the 
giving employee to try his best to build up good relationship with the giving employee, and 
win his trust (at least, not disliked by him) so that the giving employee could raise his 
openness level and codification level to his knowledge.  
Proposition 11a: the longer the duration of the transfer is, the more important it is for the 
receiving employee to establish a strong relationship with the giving employee. 
Proposition 11b: the more difficult the knowledge to be transferred, the more important it is 
for the receiving employee to establish a strong relationship with the giving employee. 
 
Situation 5: the Forceful Recipient 
In situation 5, the SME forces its customer to contribute some knowledge. The strategies for 
the SME are similar to those of situation 4, however, the SME should properly mitigate the 
tense relationship with the customer, and pay attention to the latter’s covert behaviours 
against the transfer.  
 
Situation 6: Third Party Influence (with Receiving) 
In situation 6, both the SME and its customer want the knowledge transaction on the basis of 
reciprocation, but the SMEC (i.e., the SME’s competitor) uses power (especially market 
power) to threaten the giving firm (i.e., the customer). The strategies for the SME are also 
similar to those of situation 4, but the SME would be wise to give up the transaction if the 
SMEC’s influence on the customer is much stronger than it, or it may secretly try to do the 
transaction with other external knowledge sources.  
 
Summary and future work 
 
The foregoing theoretical discussions have covered the following points: 
 A formal inter-organisational knowledge transfer process, based on the ‘process view’ 
advocated by Szulanski (2000), has been proposed. It may help organisations to gain a 
better understanding of the complexities and difficulties in inter-organisational knowledge 
transfer, and the relationship between knowledge transfer within and between 
organisations. 
 A co-ordinating mechanism has been presented to help organisations to identify the main 
influencing factors when they exchange knowledge with their customers (or suppliers), 
and develop relevant strategies. 
 Six different situations in which an SME exchanges knowledge with a customer are 
classified. Eleven propositions relating to possible strategies for SMEs are suggested. 
 
The validity of the propositions needs to be evaluated empirically. The specific work is 
planned as follows: 
 100 sample SMEs will be selected from the Fame Database, and their managers will be 
interviewed by telephone using a questionnaire designed to evaluate the validity of the 
propositions. 
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